Jump to content

Savings and loan crisis

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Savings and loan scandal)
Mortgages and interest rates
  30 year fixed rate mortgage
  15 year fixed rate mortgage
  5/1 adjustable rate mortgage
  10 year treasury yield
  Effective Federal funds rate
  Inflation Consumer price index

The Savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and 1990s (commonly dubbed the S&L crisis) was the failure of approximately a third of the savings and loan associations (S&Ls or thrifts) in the United States between 1986 and 1995. These thrifts were banks that historically specialised in fixed-rate mortgage lending.[1] The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) closed or otherwise resolved 296 thrifts from 1986 to 1989, whereupon the newly established Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) took up these responsibilities. The two agencies closed 1,043 banks that held $519 billion in assets. The total cost of taxpayers by the end of 1999 was $123.8 billion with $29.1 billion (approximately 19 percent) of losses imposed onto the thrift industry.[2]

Starting in 1979 and through the early 1980s, the Federal Reserve sharply increased interest rates in an effort to reduce inflation. At that time, thrifts had issued long-term loans at fixed interest rates that were lower than prevailing deposit rates. Attempts to attract more deposits by offering higher interest rates led to liabilities that could not be paid-for by the lower interest rates at which they had loaned money. Nor could outflowing deposits simply be paid out by sale of now less-valuable assets. The end result was that about one third of S&Ls became insolvent, causing a first wave of failures in 1981–83.

When the problem became apparent, Congress acted to permit thrifts to engage in new lending activities with the hope that they would diversity and become more profitable. This included issuance of adjustable-rate mortgages and permission to enter into commercial real estate lending. Lower capital requirements and permissive accounting standards also allowed weaker thrifts to continue operating even though under the old rules (or US GAAP) they would have been insolvent. These changes allowed for substantial risk-taking and thrifts growth. The regional concentration of thrift investments in the American south and southwest proved highly fragile. When property prices in those regions dropped in 1986, a second and larger wave of failures started.

The thrift deposit insurer, FSLIC, was unable to pay for all these failures and became insolvent. FSLIC's financial weakness also forced regulators to engage in forbearance, allowing insolvent thrifts to remain open and supporting them with capital injections. Attempts to recapitalise FSLIC arrived both too late and in insufficient amounts. Failures continued to mount through 1988 and by February 1989, Congressional legislation – the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 – was brought to establish the Resolution Trust Corporation to wind down all remaining insolvent thrifts before itself closing in 1996. More stringent capital regulations for thrifts, along with closure of some capital loopholes, were also enacted. Responsibility for thrift supervision and deposit insurance were transferred, respectively, to the new Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Causes

[edit]

Thrift institutions originated in the 19th century with the goal of pooling resources among members to make loans with which to purchase residential properties.[1] The industry grew rapidly at over 10% annually in the postwar period amid government support for home financing.[3] At the time, thrifts were regulated by two – or three, if state regulators are included, – institutions. Examinations were conducted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB); but supervisory authority was separate and resided in regional Federal Home Loan Banks.[4] Conflict of interest concerns also existed in the privately-owned home loan banks, leading to poor working relationships between federal employee examiners and the private supervisors. Delays between examinations and their reports arriving to supervisors also meant that supervisory action, if it were to be taken, would be months late.[5] Weak enforcement powers, along with thrifts' rights to contest unfavourable reports, meant the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was highly deferential to bank management.[6]

Interest rate increases

[edit]

The early 1980s saw a recession along with high interest rates, which stressed both thrift and other banking institutions considerably.[7] Negative net interest margins, due to the low interest earnt on assets with high deposit interest expenses needed to retain deposits, caused a wave of thrift failures between 1981 and 1983.[1] Federal regulations, especially Regulation Q, placed caps on deposit interest rates. Depositors responded by withdrawing their cash and depositing them in money market mutual funds. In response to these outflows, Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 which phased out Regulation Q interest rate caps and expanded thrift lending powers to include construction loans. The deposit insurance limit was also raised from 40,000 to 100,000 dollars per account.[8] The phase-out of deposit interest rate caps, however, caused thrifts' deposit interest expenses to increase substantially as they scrambled to retain depositors. The resulting decline in profitability led to a wave of thrift failures in 1981–83.[9]

Deregulation and commercial lending

[edit]

The 1981 Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act completed a process of deregulation that provided relief to weak thrifts by allowing their deposit insurer, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), to provide direct capital injections through "net worth certificates".[10] The Garn–St. Germain Act also hugely expanded thrift lending powers, allowing them to engage in commercial real estate and line-of-credit lending, which many thrifts eagerly exploited.[11] Between 1980 and 1986, thrifts' residential mortgage holdings as a proportion of assets fell from over 80 percent to less than 60.[12]

These new lending powers were not accompanied by any increase in supervisory resources or powers.[13][14] The view at the time was that the interest rate environment would quickly ease, allowing for thrifts to restructure their asset portfolios,[15] and that expanded lending powers would allow for thrifts to diversify their portfolios and engage in more profitable lending activities.[10]

Many of the loans made under expanded lending powers were concentrated in rapidly-growing states such as California, Florida, and Texas.[16] Lax state supervision and highly permissive leverage restraints allowed thrifts in these states to expand rapidly, taking on considerable risk concentrated in these business lines and geographic regions.[17] The deregulatory policy of the Reagan administration, enforced by its appointment of thrift executive Edwin J. Gray, reduced thrift examinations between 1981 and 1984 by 26 percent.[18] However, Gray's position reversed after the fraud-induced failure of Texas-based Empire Savings and Loan: he spent the next two years increasing examination resources and tightening financial regulations. Such efforts were, however, not supported by industry groups or the Reagan administration.[19] The highly-sensitive nature of commercial real estate values to local economic conditions made these thrifts highly sensitive to those local economic conditions.[20]

Forbearance

[edit]

Attempts to smooth over rough market environments included considerable regulatory forbearance: when a regulator decides not to apply regulations that normally would disrupt the operation of a bank. The FHLBB therefore progressively lowered net worth requirements from five percent in 1980 to three percent in 1982.[15] Lax phase-in rules also meant that many newer savings and loan institutions could be required to have net worth requirements lower than three percent; in fact, new institutions could be levered from two million dollars in capital to $1.3 billion in assets (a multiple of 650).[15]

The FHLBB also chose to adopt regulatory accounting principles which allowed institutions to defer reporting of losses and treat more instruments as capital. Accounting rules over supervisory goodwill (a type of intangible asset) were also liberalised, allowing thrifts to purchase other thrifts without FSLIC financial support. This had the collateral effect, however, of preventing the FHLBB from intervening against thinly-capitalised institutions whose balance sheets supported by large amounts of supervisory goodwill.[21] Policy responses chosen by the Reagan administration and adopted by the FHLBB under pressure also refrained from the use of government money; political demands not to alarm the public by closing institutions also supported forbearance. Such choices exposed taxpayers to losses through the deposit insurance scheme while allowing troubled institutions to continue deposit-taking and lending operations.[22]

By 1983, even though the interest rate environment had substantially eased, a tenth of thrifts were insolvent on a GAAP basis, with those institutions controlling 35 percent of thrift industry assets. Even so, such institutions were allowed to continue operating.[23]

Fraud

[edit]

While considerable attention has been placed on fraudulent practices at thrift institutions, they were likely not a major contributor to the savings and loan crisis. Expert estimates as of a Congressional Budget Office report in 1992 as to the proportion of losses due to fraud eventually borne by the government range from three to 25 percent.[24] Estimates of the number of failures that involve fraud or insider abuse ranges considerably. An Office of the Comptroller of the Currency study in 1988 indicated fraud in 11 percent of failures between 1979–87; a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation study in 25 percent of failures in 1989; a Resolution Trust Corporation study in 1992 found fraud in 33 percent of its cases; and a 1994 General Accounting Office study reported 26 percent of banks that failed in 1990–91 had issues with fraud.[25]

Regardless, there was fraud and insider looting of thrift institutions in some cases. The Crime Control Act of 1990, after the crisis, established a special counsel to investigate and prosecute fraud in financial institutions. Between 1988 and 1992, the Department of Justice sent 1,706 bankers to prison and found guilty verdicts in 2,603 cases.[26]

Thrift failures

[edit]
Insolvent thrift institutions (1980–89)[27]
Year # of thrifts # insolvent[28] % insolvent
1980 3,993 43 1.1%
1981 3,751 112 3.0%
1982 3,287 415 12.6%
1983 3,146 515 16.4%
1984 3,136 695 22.2%
1985 3,246 705 21.7%
1986 3,220 672 20.9%
1987 3,147 672 21.4%
1988 2,949 508 17.2%
1989 2,878 516 17.9%

Realisation of interest-rate risk in the early 1980s led to a short series of failures that impelled a deregulatory episode from 1980–81. The failure of Empire Savings and Loan in 1984 also drove the FHLBB to reverse course and tighten regulations on thrifts.[19]

Intensification

[edit]

The first major thrifts to go were in Ohio and Maryland in 1985. That March, Home State Savings Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio collapsed after a depositor run triggered by news that it had lost $540 million in a securities scam. Not insured by the federal government via FSLIC, it was instead insured by a private state insurance program. This program became promptly insolvent and the governor, Richard F. Celeste, ordered the first bank holiday since the Great Depression.[29] In Maryland, that May, Old Court Savings and Loans similarly failed. The panic also spread across Maryland thrifts, which also insured by their state and not the federal government. The governor, Harry R. Hughes, capped deposit withdrawals; by June, the Maryland legislature ordered all state-insured thrifts either to become FSLIC members or liquidate in six months. The thrift failures in Ohio and Maryland cost those states' taxpayers some 250 million dollars.[30]

A sharp regional recession in the southwestern United States and Texas, caused by a drop in oil prices, caused a fall in the value of commercial real estate in those areas. Thrifts in those states, highly exposed to local commercial real estate prices through their heavy aggressive lending activities, quickly became insolvent.[31] Pressure compounded on banks due to follow-on real estate effects and an agricultural recession in Great Plains states.[32] The elimination of favourable tax treatment for real estate construction in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 also contributed to a slowdown in constructing lending.[33]

FSLIC recapitalisation

[edit]
FSLIC reserves (1980–89)[27]
Year Reserves (billions $)
1980 6.5
1981 6.2
1982 6.3
1983 6.4
1984 5.6
1985 4.6
1986 –6.3
1987 –13.7
1988 –75.0
1989 Dissolved

The failures in 1985–86 were extremely expensive for FSLIC. Resolving those failures cost $7.4 billion in 1985 and $9.1 billion in 1986. This brought the FSLIC reserve fund to less than $2 billion on the eve of 1987. Compounding this, the size of the thrift industry had expanded considerably, meaning that the money in that reserve fund was spread thin.[34][35] FSLIC's immediate response was to cut the costs of resolution by deferring asset sales for more favourable market conditions. The Reagan administration recognised by April 1986 that FSLIC was itself approaching insolvency; it asked Congress for $15 billion to pay for FSLIC costs. Little was done on the matter. By January 1987, the problems were of such magnitude that it was the first piece of business in the new session. However, specifics of the funding bill were harshly debated. The thrift industry group, supported by House Speaker Jim Wright, insisted on less than $7.5 billion and compulsory regulatory forbearance. While the administration resented the inclusion of regulatory forbearance, public news of FSLIC's impending (or already actual) insolvency in a GAO report led the administration to accept regulatory forbearance for more money. The resulting Competitive Equality Banking Act was signed on August 11, 1987, giving FSLIC $10.8 billion dollars through sale of bonds via an off-balance sheet government entity.[36][37] It also required thrift supervisors not to close savings and loan institutions that had equity capital of more than 0.5 percent.[38]

The effect of the 1987 act was that risky institutions were unrestrained in their risk-taking behaviours. They then attempted to "gamble for resurrection",[39] hoping that even riskier lending would allow them to get sufficient profits to stave off bankruptcy. The effect of assistance also engendered moral hazard, where owners could accrue profits from risky loans but place losses at the feet of taxpayers.[40]

At the end of 1988, 2,969 thrifts remained. This was over three hundred less than in 1985 and over a thousand less than in 1980. A third of the failures from 1985 forward occurred in just three states: California, Texas, and Florida.[41] The FHLBB, under its new chairman, M. Danny Wall, attempted to sell off hundreds of insolvent thrifts in receivership. These sales could only be accomplished with substantial government support and although it allowed FSLIC to dispose of almost 200 thrifts by the end of 1988, some 250 insolvent institutions with $81 billion in assets remained.[42]

FIRREA and the RTC

[edit]
Further information: Resolution Trust Corporation

The number of banks that were formally insolvent under FHLBB regulatory guidelines at the end of 1988 was 250, however, the number insolvent after excluding intangible assets more than doubled to 508. These insolvent thrifts continued to lose money rapidly. Moreover, FSLIC at the same time was itself insolvent.[43] The new president, George H. W. Bush, announced a proposal on February 6, 1989, to resolve the thrift failures.[44] The plan included three major elements: a temporary agency would be created with 50 billion dollars in funding to liquidate the insolvent thrift institutions with that money being raised via another off-balance sheet vehicle paid for by higher insurance premia on the thrift industry; the FHLBB and FSLIC would be dissolved, with supervisory powers devolving to the incipient Office of Thrift Supervision within the Treasury Department and the FDIC; regulations would be tightened as well, with regulatory capital no longer including intangibles such as goodwill and doubled to six percent within two years.[45] On August 9, 1989, the proposals brought by Bush were passed essentially unchanged as the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 into law.[46] Many other regulatory provisions were also included, such as risk-based capital applied to thrifts, re-imposition of restrictions on thrifts' non-residential mortgage portfolios, and funding for financial crimes prosecutions.[47]

The Resolution Trust Corporation, created by the act, sold or liquidated all remaining thrifts. Those institutions remained for the time being in operation under conservatorship. The RTC was also given generous amounts of time to sell assets in small tranches: buyers were more willing to purchase smaller portions and the RTC was also able to assess and market its assets.[48] The closure of FSLIC and the creation of RTC only to sell or liquidate insolvent institutions also forced thrift owners to take fewer risks since they knew that assistance would no longer be forthcoming.[49] In 1989 the RTC disposed of 37 thrifts at a cost of $51 billion, which came under fire from congressional leadership. The next year, 1990, saw the sale of 315 institutions at a cost of $20 billion. Congress, although criticising the RTC for its ballooning staff, appropriated an additional $30 billion in March 1991.[50] Late in that year, many of the assets bundled into mortgage-backed and commercial-paper backed securities.[51] Amid a funding deficiency, the RTC was forced to shut down operations in 1991, but after new appropriations in 1993, the RTC was wound down by year-end 1996. Overall, it recovered 78 percent of the book value of all assets and disposed of 747 thrift institutions with $402.6 billion in assets.[52]

Scandals

[edit]

A number of high-profile thrift failures and scandals also emerged from the crisis. Notable institutions included:

  • Lamar Savings and Loan (Austin, TX), led by Stanley Adams, which cost $2 billion to resolve;
  • Vernon Savings and Loan (Dallas, TX), led by Don Dixon, which on resolution had 94 percent of loans non-performing; and
  • Columbia Savings and Loan (Beverly Hills, CA), led by Thomas Spiegel, was closed in January 1991 at the cost of $3.25 dollars.[53]

Especially publicised was the insolvency of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, led by influential Republican donor and political figure Charles Keating. Between 1984 and 1989 it five-fold, investing mainly in commercial property and equities. After a FHLB brought recommended the thrift be seized for criminal fraud in 1987, Keating leaned on senators Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), John McCain (R-AZ), Alan Cranston (D-CA), John Glenn (D-OH), and Donald Riegle (D-MI) to curtail the investigation. When it became known that the five men, later dubbed the Keating Five, had received $1.3 million in campaign contributions, they became embroiled in a congressional ethics investigation. Eventually, the matter was dropped by the new FHLBB chairman, Danny Wall, who later resigned in December 1989 for failure to take action against Lincoln, which failed that year at a cost of $2.6 billion.[54] Keating was eventually prosecuted and convicted, but the convictions were overturned due to incorrect jury instructions and, later, a poisoned jury. Eventually, in 1999, he pled guilty and was sentenced to time served.[55][56]

Other political figures were similarly drawn in to allegations of fraud and corruption. Jim Wright, the House Speaker, was forced to resign in 1989 amid ethics investigations related to Vernon Savings and Loan and pressure to sack William K. Black, a deputy director in FSLIC.[57][58] Similarly, Neil Bush, the son of then-vice president George H. W. Bush, was hauled before Congress and sued by the FDIC for his involvement in Silverado Savings and Loan (Denver, CO), which failed in December 1989.[59]

Consequences

[edit]

Savings and Loan were not the only financial institutions that were adversely affected by the crisis. Many banks failed as well. Between 1980 and 1994 more than 1,600 banks insured by the FDIC were closed or received FDIC financial assistance.[60][page needed]

From the start of 1986 to the end of 1995, the federally insured thrifts fell by approximately half from 3,234 to 1,645.[61] The market share of S&Ls for single family mortgage loans went from 53% in 1975 to 30% in 1990.[62]

The federal government ultimately appropriated $105 billion to resolve the crisis. After banks repaid loans through various procedures, by the end of 1999, taxpayers suffered losses of $123.8 billion with an additional $29.1 billion (approximately 19 percent) of losses imposed onto the thrift industry.[63]

The concomitant slowdown in the finance industry and the real estate market may have been a contributing cause of the 1990–1991 economic recession. Between 1986 and 1991, the number of new homes constructed dropped from 1.8 million to 1 million, the lowest rate since World War II.[62]

Some commentators believe that a taxpayer-funded government bailout related to mortgages during the savings and loan crisis may have created a moral hazard and acted as encouragement to lenders to make similar higher risk loans during the 2007 subprime mortgage financial crisis.[64]

See also

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c Sharma 2022, p. 39.
  2. ^ Curry & Shibut 2000, p. 26 (total assets of closed institutions), 33 (cost to the public, broken down by taxpayers and industry also noting that liquidation of RTC assets would not materially affect losses); see also p. 29 noting confusion among previous estimates.
  3. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 129, 139 (Table 5.1).
  4. ^ Moysich 1997, p. 171.
  5. ^ Moysich 1997, pp. 171–72.
  6. ^ Moysich 1997, p. 172.
  7. ^ Sharma 2022, p. 39; Mason 2004, p. 213.
  8. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 215–16.
  9. ^ Sharma 2022, p. 39; Mason 2004, p. 218.
  10. ^ a b Mason 2004, p. 219.
  11. ^ Mason 2004, p. 219; Hanc 1997, p. 10.
  12. ^ Moysich 1997, p. 179 (Figure 4.1).
  13. ^ Hanc 1997, p. 26, noting that underwriting standards fell without controls by property.
  14. ^ Curry & Shibut 2000, p. 27, noting "the deregulation of the thrift industry without an accompanying increase in examination resources".
  15. ^ a b c Moysich 1997, p. 173.
  16. ^ Mason 2004, p. 224.
  17. ^ Sharma 2022, p. 40; Mason 2004, p. 224.
  18. ^ Mason 2004, p. 226.
  19. ^ a b Mason 2004, pp. 226–27.
  20. ^ Freund et al. 1997, p. 158.
  21. ^ Moysich 1997, pp. 173–77.
  22. ^ Moysich 1997, pp. 177, 187.
  23. ^ Moysich 1997, p. 180, noting that this forbearance policy allowed thrifts "to substitute credit risk for interest-rate risk".
  24. ^ Iden & Manchester 1992, pp. 11–12.
  25. ^ Hanc 1997, p. 34, citing:
    • Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (1988). Bank failure: an evaluation of the factors contributing to the failure of national banks (Report).
    • General Accounting Office (March 1994). Bank insider activities: insider problems and violations indicate broder management deficiencies (Report). GAO/GGD-94-88.{{cite report}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
  26. ^ General Accounting Office (January 8, 1993). Bank and thrift criminal fraud: the federal commitment could be broadened (PDF) (Report). pp. 4, 6, 77 (exact statistics). GAO/GGD-93-48.
  27. ^ a b Moysich 1997, p. 168 (Table 4.1).
  28. ^ Moysich 1997, p. 168, noting that the number of insolvent thrifts is determined on a tangible capital to assets basis; this is not based on the FHLBB regulatory capital rules.
  29. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 227–28.
  30. ^ Mason 2004, p. 228.
  31. ^ Sharma 2022, p. 40; Mason 2004, pp. 228–29.
  32. ^ Hanc 1997, p. 16.
  33. ^ Mason 2004, p. 229.
  34. ^ Mason 2004, p. 230.
  35. ^ Moysich 1997, p. 168 (Table 4.1), instead reporting that on the eve of 1987, FSLIC had reserves of –6.3 billion dollars.
  36. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 232–33.
  37. ^ Moysich 1997, p. 186, noting the amount in the Competitive Equality Banking Act was "clearly inadequate".
  38. ^ Mason 2004, p. 233.
  39. ^ E.g. Bernanke, Ben (April 11, 2007). Financial Regulation and the Invisible Hand (Speech). New York University Law School. Equity holders may 'gamble for resurrection' by encouraging rather than discouraging excessive risk-taking. Thus, as was evident in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, market discipline by equity holders may break down when it is most needed.
  40. ^ Sharma 2022, p. 41.
  41. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 239–40.
  42. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 235–36.
  43. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 241–42.
  44. ^ Mason 2004, p. 242; Moysich 1997, p. 186.
  45. ^ Mason 2004, p. 242.
  46. ^ Mason 2004, p. 244.
  47. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 246–47.
  48. ^ Mason 2004, p. 248.
  49. ^ Sharma 2022, pp. 45–46.
  50. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 251–52, noting the RTC Funding Act, Pub. L. 102–18.
  51. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 252–53.
  52. ^ Mason 2004, pp. 253–54.
  53. ^ Mason 2004, p. 237.
  54. ^ Mason 2004, p. 238.
  55. ^ McCarthy, Donald (2004). "Lincoln Savings: a Coda". In Barth, James R; Trimbath, Susanne; Yago, Glenn (eds.). The Savings and Loan Crisis: Lessons from a Regulatory Failure. Milken Institute. pp. 173–178. doi:10.1007/1-4020-7898-6_10. ISBN 978-1-4020-7871-2.
  56. ^ McFadden, Robert D (April 2, 2014). "Charles Keating, 90, Key Figure in '80s Savings and Loan Crisis, Dies". New York Times.
  57. ^ "Excerpts From Charges Against Wright by the House Panel". New York Times. April 18, 1989.
  58. ^ Riccucci, Norma (1995). Unsung Heroes. Georgetown University Press. pp. 44–45. ISBN 978-0-87840-595-4.
  59. ^ See eg:
  60. ^ Hanc 1997.
  61. ^ Curry & Shibut 2000, p. 26.
  62. ^ a b "Housing Finance in Developed Countries An International Comparison of Efficiency, United States" (PDF). Fannie Mae. 1992. pp. 4, 8.
  63. ^ Curry & Shibut 2000, p. 33.
  64. ^ Weiner, Eric (November 29, 2007). "Subprime Bailout: Good Idea or "Moral Hazard"". National Public Radio.

References

[edit]

Books

[edit]

Articles and chapters

[edit]
[edit]
External videos
video icon Booknotes interview with Martin Mayer on The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the Savings and Loan Industry, November 25, 1990, C-SPAN


Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Savings_and_loan_crisis&oldid=1255658540"